Saturday, July 19, 2008

Theodicy

I recently watched a debate between John Loftus and David Wood on the problem of evil. Interesting discussion (I especially liked Woods' "argument from Venus de Milo", heh), however it was generally more of the usual when you get right to the meat of things. I posted the following comment:

Interesting discussion. My thoughts are as follow.

In part three, around minute 14, Mr. Loftus says that he simply wants Mr. Wood to explain, on Wood's own worldview, why there is such much grotesque suffering in the world. He doesn't need to account for something so complex as the idea of "evil" (yet), he merely wants to know why an objective feature of reality is the way it is, given Wood's Christian worldview.

Even though I disagree with the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions behind that challenge, even granted them for the sake of discussion, there are problems.

First, the simplest answer that meets Loftus' criterion of providing an account for the existence of "so much" suffering, and is consistent with the biblical account of God, is that suffering (of whatever kind or degree) exists because God has a telic purpose for it which is consistent with His own moral character. Without a more complex notion like "evil" (or "bad", or whatever name you wish to attach to negative value judgments), the challenge goes "thus far, but no farther."

So that brings us to the second point. Mr. Loftus *is* using "suffering" as a value-laden term. He is evaluating it by levels. So what? Yeah--but not quantitative levels--*qualitative* levels. It's not that a cat tearing apart a bird causes "so much more" suffering than something else (that is, in terms of something like the number of neural pain "signals" processed or something--in fact, a quick death like that may "hurt" less than say, dieing of thirst; a very old person and newborn both die peacefully in their sleep, but the infant's death is "tragic" while the elderly person simply "lived a nice, full life"). No it's not quantity that distinguishes here. It's something about the quality of the situation that causes him to valuate it on a different level from just "unpleasant" or "unfortunate" and value it as "bad"--i.e., that which should not be (notice the ethical imperative hidden in there).

If Loftus simply sticks to his first tact and denies that his use of "suffering" is value-laden, he has an answer as to why there is suffering (of any sort or amount), and Christianity has won the debate already, right here. Nothing is inherently problematic with saying that volitional being does something (or ceases from doing something) for a reason. In fact, that's a major feature that distinguishes volitional and non-volitional beings.

But Mr. Loftus seems willing to go further than this--he appears to want to have standards of "fairness" or "truth" (e.g., "What did [innocent, helpless animals] do wrong [to deserve to suffer]?"--note the contradiction of terms used to rhetorically imply a negative value judgment and negative valuation of injustice)--and indeed, to raise any objection against a volitional being acting for a reason, he must introduce a system of moral standards and judgments, that will allow for the value-laden use of suffering--allow for the valuation of that reason for which the volitional being acts. These moral obligations might be along the lines of "a rational being *should* only act on reasons which are logically true and justified" or "a caring being *should* only act on reasons which tend to minimize all form and degree of suffering", "a just being *should* only act on reasons that result in consequences for all beings which are proportional to their actions" (and that is just to say that it is "evil" ("bad", &c) to fail to meet such obligations).

Only with such prescriptive standards in hand could Loftus attempt a move from the fact of suffering to some argument for doubting the existence or attributes of the Christian God. But at that point, the Christian is certainly within his rights to ask Mr. Loftus to account for the possibility of such a system of standards and judgments, given his own worldview. If it merely arises by convention or chance, then I'm not obligated to hold it. If holds that value judgments are not inherently different from imaginings or hallucinations, then I'm not obligated to hold it. In cases such as those, it has no logical necessity: it just happens to be the way it is, or happens to be how Americans look at things, or happens to be the epiphenomenal twinklings of molecules bumping together, &c, which makes it non-sense (it logically says I'm obligated (prescriptive) to behave in certain ways, and metalogically says people just happen to behave that way (descriptive).

However, if Mr. Loftus' ethical system really is normative and not merely descriptive, how is that possible on his worldview? According to his view, why is it absolutely wrong to whip a slave woman (or for that matter, to own a slave woman in the first place)? Mr. Loftus may, theoretically, be able to come up with a prescriptive ethical system on his worldview (I don't believe it's possible, but again, just for discussion). That's fine. But until he does, Christians are justified in saying that his challenge has been met: God ordains suffering in the world because of his over-arching telic purpose for the world which is consistent with His own holy moral character. The ball is in Mr. Loftus' court now.

Without even getting into the issue of defining the Christian concepts of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence (which, by the way, are almost always misdefined because of misunderstanding the omni- prefix as applying to absolutely everything rather than the accurate meaning of everything possible)--and without considering some of the usual theodicies offered (necessary evil, free will, so forth--most of which I think are unbiblical anyhow)--the problem is solved.

If a person wishes to challenge the Christian worldview on the basis of the existence of suffering, they need to be prepared to take that argument forward from just the fact of suffering to the value judgment of evil (and BTW, what is suffering, exactly? The perception of physical pain? Emotional pain? Neural discharges? Some combination?). And in turn, be ready to supply a moral framework in which such a concept of evil is intelligible as an abstract, universal principal of judgment.

Certainly, one could argue that the existence of the Christian God and the fact of suffering are incompatible, according to the Christian system of morality. And many people do try to go that route. A Christian could equally well ask for justification here for the abstract, universal principals of logic necessary to make such an argument, and no headway is made over the other approach. But even granting the possibility of such an account for the sake of discussion, the argument is self-defeating. If we're going to accept the Christian system of morality for the sake of argument, then on Christianity, God is perfectly consistent and unchanging in His own nature. Moral value judgments are derived from God's nature. Ergo, no moral value judgments can ever cast doubt on the nature of God. Once again, the simple theodicy suffices that God has a telic purpose for the existence of evil which is compatible with His nature.

Genesis 50:18-21 His brothers also came and fell down before him and said, Behold, we are your servants. (19) But Joseph said to them, Do not fear, for am I in the place of God? (20) As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today. (21) So do not fear; I will provide for you and your little ones. Thus he comforted them and spoke kindly to them. (ESV)

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